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COMMON GROUND: RECONCILING RIGHTS AND 
COMMUNAL CONCERNS IN REAL PROPERTY LAW 
Thomas F. McInerney III* 
But the most common and durable source of factions has been the 
various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and 
those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in 
society. . . . The regulation of these various and interfering interests 
forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit 
of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of gov-
ernment. 
---James Madison, The Federalist, No. 10. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Reconciling competing interests in real property continues to pre-
sent a challenge to American society. Recent Supreme Court decisions 
involving the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment present a new 
challenge through the expansion of individual rights to property. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia have been at the forefront 
of the Court's efforts to create a new-found fundamental right. Unlike 
other judicial attempts to expand the scope of constitutional rights, 
this departure seems drawn neither to fulfill some unmet societal need 
nor to fill a gap or inadequacy from existing precedent. Such move-
ment is based on an outdated and philosophically questionable con-
ception of real property rights. 
Nowhere is this expansion of property rights more glaring than in 
the context of cases under the Takings Clause. In criticizing the 
conventional wisdom feeding our understanding of takings cases, this 
* Associate, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, New York, New York; J.D., DePaul University College 
of Law, 1995; M.A. (Philosophy), Loyola University of Chicago, 1992; B.A., College of William 
and Mary, 1990. 
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Essay will attempt to expose the ideological presuppositions making 
recent decisions seem "reasonable" despite the rather questionable 
philosophical basis for such views.1 First, the author will analyze a 
number of recent Supreme Court takings cases to identify certain 
underlying principles. Next, the Essay will procede with an analysis 
of three contemporary legal theorists to examine their views on com-
munity with a view to the role of real property in a community. 
Finally, using these theorists for guidance, the author will develop a 
communitarian view of real property to expose the problematic as-
sumptions underlying the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence. 
Specifically, the author will argue that, properly understood, property 
rights should be conceived as embodying certain communal concerns 
which eliminates some of the apparent conflicts between the rights of 
individuals and those of communities. 
II. ANALYSIS OF RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES 
To highlight the philosophical implications of the Supreme Court's 
takings jurisprudence, I have chosen four cases. In selecting the 
following cases (one is a dissent from a denial of certiorari), the author 
chose those which are most significant to understanding the Rehn-
quist Court's conception of property rights. The Essay will focus 
chiefly on the portions of the opinions which implicitly or explicitly 
articulate the Court's broader philosophical understanding of the 
place of property rights under the Constitution. 
A. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. 
County of Los Angeles 
In First English, the Court held that a local government ordinance 
which prohibited construction on a flood plain constituted an imper-
missible taking under the Constitution, requiring compensation.2 
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist sketched a factual back-
1 Attention thus will be paid primarily to the fundamental meaning of the legal texts furnish-
ing the backdrop for this Essay. Accordingly, the rhetoric of the Court's recent takings cases is 
somewhat secondary to the question of the logic underlying the propositions the Court an-
nounces. For a discussion of the structures of narratives, see Roland Barthes, Structural 
Analysis of Narratives, in A BARTHES READER 294--95 (1982). While this Essay does not 
purport to completely demystify the Court's recent cases, it does employ the insights of Barthes 
and other poststructuralists in developing critical perspectives. 
2 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304 (1987). 
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ground which at first glance would have seemed to support the regu-
lation. The First Evangelical Church bought a 21-acre parcel of land 
in a canyon along a creek.3 The creek served as a drainage channel for 
a watershed area owned by the National Forest Service.4 On this land, 
the church built a number of lodges, a dining hall, and an outdoor 
chapel. 6 The facility served as a retreat center and a recreational area 
for disabled children.6 
In 1978, the creek overflowed following extensive flooding and de-
stroyed all of the buildings on the property.7 Shortly thereafter, the 
County of Los Angeles passed an ordinance prohibiting construction 
of any structure on the flood protection area near the creek. 8 The 
rationale for this regulation was to "preserv[e] the public health and 
safety."9 The church sued both the county and Flood Control District 
for creating dangerous conditions on properties upstream and for 
denying the church all effective use of the property by passing the 
ordinance in question. lO The church also sought to recover from the 
Flood Control District in inverse condemnation, alleging that the 
District's cloud seeding during a storm caused the flooding.ll The trial 
court and appellate court rejected the church's inverse condemnation 
claim, relying upon a state court decision which prohibited suits for in-
verse condemnation when based on a "regulatory" taking.12 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court denied review after which the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the case of 
Agins v. Tiburon, relied upon by the trial court, should preclude 
recovery in the case.13 
In Agins, the California Supreme Court determined that claims for 
inverse condemnation would be invalid until a regulation had been 




7 First English, 482 U.S. at 307. 
8Id. Specifically, the ordinance stated: "[aJ person shall not construct, reconstruct, place or 
enlarge any building or structure, any portion of which is, or will be, located within the outer 
boundary lines of the interim flood protection area located in [the canyonJ." Id. 
9Id. 
10Id. at 308. 
11 Id. 
12 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 32 (Cal. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 
(1980). On the doctrine of regulatory takings, see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 
(1922). 
13 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, Califor-
nia, 478 U.S. 1003 (1986). 
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found excessive on a writ of mandamus or a declaratory judgment.14 
As such, the Court's review in First English was limited to the issue 
posed by Agins: whether the Just Compensation Clause, as an incor-
porated right, does not require compensation for a temporary "regu-
latory" taking.16 The Court neither ruled on the takings claim on the 
merits nor did it consider the argument that the takings claim could 
be resolved by considering the regulation a public safety measure.16 
After clarifying the grounds on which the Court would entertain 
the case, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that resolving the issue re-
quired "direct reference to the language of the Fifth Amendment."17 
Under the ''basic understanding" of the Amendment, any taking of 
property implicated the obligation to pay just compensation.18 As to 
what constituted a taking of property, the Court made familiar refer-
ence to Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 
which recognized that certain regulatory takings are takings requir-
ing compensation.19 In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes created 
the ambiguous standard used by the Rehnquist Court to analyze 
regulatory takings claims. Under this doctrine, "[t]he general rule at 
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."20 Rehnquist 
next moved to the question of whether a taking may occur absent 
even a formal eminent domain proceeding.21 Naturally, he concluded, 
"the entire doctrine of inverse condemnation" stands for the proposi-
tion that a regulation may effect a taking without a property-specific 
eminent domain proceeding.22 Finally, the Court recognized the policy 
rationale for giving land use planners freedom as well as the inhibi-
tions posed by the inverse condemnation remedy, yet noted that such 
arguments against the inverse condemnation remedy would be sub-
sidiary to the ultimate Fifth Amendment right to just compensation.23 
After resolving these preliminaries, the Court turned to the ques-
tion of whether a government's decision to cease its engagement in 
condemnation proceedings would require compensation for the period 
14 First English, 482 u.s. at 3084>9. 
16 [d. at 310 
16 [d. at 313; see also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
17 First English, 482 U.S. at 314. 
18 [d. at 315. 
19 [d. at 316. 
20 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
21 First English, 482 U.S. at 316. 
22 [d. 
28 [d. at 317. 
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during which the property was unusable by the property owner.24 
Applying the United States v. Dow case,26 the Court concluded that 
given the fact that an owner would be deprived of his use of land for 
the period during which the government's regulation was effective, a 
temporary taking had occurred, which required compensation.26 While 
the Court recognized that fluctuations in value by reason of legislative 
deliberation do not constitute a taking, the Court decided that "de-
preciations in value by reason of preliminary activity" do not consti-
tute a taking, but that where a taking already has occurred, the 
government must provide compensation during the period of the 
effective taking.27 
The dissenters, led by Justice Stevens, chose to discuss the merits 
of the case, but noted that "the Court [did] not hold that appellant is 
entitled to compensation as a result of a flood protection regulation."28 
Indeed, the dissenters argued that the regulation could not have 
constituted a taking.29 On Justice Stevens' analysis, the loss of life and 
the destruction caused by the tragic flood provided a sufficient basis 
in fact to conclude that the church never could rebuild on the land, 
and thus never could have suffered a taking in the first place.30 
In view of the fact that the constitutional question was perhaps not 
ripe for Supreme Court review, the implications of First English for 
takings jurisprudence are unclear. At a minimum, the case demon-
strates the Court's desire to take takings claims more seriously, at 
least by ensuring that land owners receive a remedy for regulations 
which decrease the economic value of land. Nonetheless, in view of 
the rather dubious takings claim when considered on the merits-it 
would appear to be a valid safety regulation under traditional tests31-
First English may have foreshadowed the Rehnquist Court's future 
expansion of Takings Clause jurisprudence.32 
24 Id. at 317-18. 
25 See generally United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958). 
26 See First Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 319, 321-22. 
27 See id. at 320, 321. 
28 Id. at 325. 
29 Id. 
ao Id. at 327-28. 
31 See generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
32 Some commentators have considered the Court's willingness to hear takings cases evidence 
of a departure from traditional "restraint in takings cases." Randall T. Shepard, Land Use 
Regulation in the Rehnquist Court: The Fifth Amendment and Judicial Intervention, 38 CATH. 
U.L. REV. 847, 848 (1989). If such traditional reluctance, as the author suggests, was based on 
the Court's belief in the need to consider the full factual record, it is unclear whether this new 
tendency has disavowed such a judicial policy or whether the cases chosen are simply factually 
clear.Id. 
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B. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 
In Nollan, Justice Scalia, writing for a five-person majority, held 
that a governmental body could condition the grant of a building 
permit to a land owner on the owner's grant of an easement back to 
the government, provided that the condition substantially furthered 
government purposes.sa While upholding the condition, the Court con-
cluded that such an easement would require compensation. 
The Nollans owned a beachfront lot on the California coast.34 The 
lot was situated between a public beach and a public park.36 Between 
the beach and the rest of the property stood an eight-foot high sea 
wall. The N ollans originally leased the property with an option to buy. 
This option had been conditioned on their promise to demolish the 
bungalow then on the lot and replace it.36 The Nollans sought the 
approval of the Coastal Commission, as required under state law, to 
build a three-bedroom house on the site of the previous 504-square-
foot bungalow.37 
In reaching its decision, the Coastal Commission held public hear-
ings and determined that the proposed development would burden 
the public's ability to walk along the shorefront, would increase pri-
vate use of the shorefront, and would block views of the shore, thus 
preventing the public from recognizing-psychologically, at least-
their right to visit the shore.3s On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled 
that while the condition diminished the value of the property, it did 
not deprive them of all reasonable use and thus was not a taking of 
property requiring compensation.39 The Supreme Court took the case 
solely to decide the takings issue.4o 
From the outset, Justice Scalia noted that had it not been a case 
involving a condition but instead an outright grant of an easement, it 
would have been a taking requiring compensation.41 This rested on 
the fact that he considered the right to exclude others "one of the 
most essential sticks in the bundle of [property] rights."42 Where a 
88 See NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987). 
84 [d. at 827. 
36 See id. 
36 [d. at 828. 
87 See id. at 827-28. 
88 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29. 
88 See id. at 830. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 831. 
42 [d. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982». 
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"permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro" is given to the 
public, even where an individual may permanently situate himself on 
the premises, a permanent physical invasion has occurred.43 
The fact that the Coastal Commission publicly announced its policy 
of requiring easements along the coast, was considered unpersuasive 
by Justice Scalia.44 The right to build, Justice Scalia asserted, was not 
a government benefit which land owners could be required to ex-
change voluntarily.45 Justice Scalia next announced the long standing 
rule that a land use regulation which "substantially advance[d] legiti-
mate state interests" and did not "den[y] an owner economically 
viable use of his land" would not constitute a taking.46 While the 
government would be permitted to exercise broad powers in this 
regard, he dismissed the government's stated purposes in Nollan 
as pretextua1.47 The real problem was the conditioning, though as 
Justice Scalia noted, an outright denial of the permit would have been 
permissible.48 In rejecting the government's stated purpose, Justice 
Scalia claimed that on these facts, the condition imposing the ease-
ment would have been an "outright plan of extortion."49 The rest of 
the opinion consists of Justice Scalia's scrutiny of the stated purposes 
behind the regulation. 
The Nollan case is important to the development of the Rehnquist 
Court's approach to the Takings Clause as it represents a departure 
from the minimum rationality standard applicable to regulatory tak-
ings cases toward the new standard of strict scrutiny.50 Much of the 
opinion consists of Justice Scalia's criticism of the stated purpose for 
the law. This type of scrutiny over regulations which detrimentally 
43 Nollan, 483 u.s. at 832. Commentators have considered the permanent physical occupation 
to amount to a per se rule against takings based on the holding of Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). See generally Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings 
Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part II-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of 
Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53 (1990). 
44 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833-34 n.2. 
45 See id. 
46Id. at 834. 
47Id. at 835-36. 
48Id. 
49 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
50 Although Justice Scalia used the term "substantially advance" as the criteria for evaluating 
state interests in takings cases, he departed from the traditional use of these words as a 
deferential standard of review while applying a standard of "nearly compelling." See J. Freitag, 
Note, Takings 1992: Scalia's Jurisprudence and a Fifth Amendment Doctrine to Avoid Lochner 
Redivivu8, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 743, 759 n.98 (1994). See also Robert A. Williams, Jr., Legal 
Discourse, Social Vision and the Supreme Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of 
the Lochnerian Recurrence in First English Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 
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affect the economic well-being of citizens is novel. Moreover, the type 
of scrutiny the Court employed seems in tension with the portion of 
the First English case in which the Court acknowledged that mere 
decreases in value, which did not meet a given threshold or go "too 
far," would not constitute takings.51 Justice Scalia's opinion wrongly 
assumed that the N ollans actually owned the property and were 
subject to the condition of the easement as an infringement on their 
ownership rights. The N ollans only held an option to purchase, con-
ditioned on their building of a new structure. When the Coastal Com-
mission imposed a general shoreline easement requirement, the N 01-
lans option might have been affected, but not the value of the entire 
property. As such, it is difficult to see how the facts of Nollan would 
meet the threshold discussed in First English. Moreover, the new 
two-prong test of "substantially advancing state interests" and the 
denial of "economically viable use of land" was unprecedented. This 
new test, with the concomitant strict scrutiny standard, set the course 
for the Court's current direction in evaluating takings claims. 
C. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
In Lucas, the Supreme Court held that an environmental regulation 
which prevented a property owner from developing his land by build-
ing homes on it exacted a taking by depriving the owner of all bene-
ficial use of the property.52 Lucas purchased two residential lots on the 
Isle of Palms in South Carolina in 1986 intending to build residential 
homes on the properties.53 South Carolina's legislature enacted legis-
lation in 1988 which effectively barred Lucas from building any per-
manent habitable structures on the land.54 The South Carolina Su-
preme Court rejected Lucas's argument that he had suffered a taking, 
holding instead that the legislation was designed to prevent "serious 
public harm" by protecting a public resource, thus precluding a tak-
ings claim.66 
427,472 (1988) (noting that Justice Scalia's footnote rebuttal to Justice Brennan "can be safely 
read for the proposition that private property interests are as fundamental as first amendment 
interests, and are thus deserving of heightened judicial protection."). 
51 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. at 329-30 (1987). 
52 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
58 ld. at 1008. 
54ld.atl~. 
55 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991). In support of its 
holding, the court cited inter alia Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), for the proposition 
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In Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, he makes clear the fact 
that Lucas purchased the property specifically to develop it.56 When 
he purchased the property, the state did not require him to seek a 
permit from the Coastal Council.67 Nonetheless, by the time the South 
Carolina Supreme Court was deciding the case, the legislature had 
authorized the issuance of "special permits" which could have allowed 
Lucas to build anyway.68 Over ripeness questions, the Court chose to 
take the case as the justices concluded that Lucas had alleged a 
sufficient Article III injury in fact.69 
The main portion of the five-person majority opinion began with 
the familiar regulatory taking doctrine announced in Pennsylvania 
Coal which required compensation for takings that went "too far."60 
Eschewing any "set formula" for regulatory takings questions,61 Jus-
tice Scalia articulated two specific categories of regulations requiring 
compensation: "[The] first encompasses regulations that compel the 
property owner to suffer physical 'invasion' of his property .... The 
second situation in which we have found categorical treatment appro-
priate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or pro-
ductive use of land."62 Without explaining the significance in terms of 
these two general categories, Justice Scalia next stated, "the Fifth 
Amendment is violated when [a] land-use regulation 'does not sub-
stantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner eco-
nomically viable use of his land."'63 As to the threshold of what con-
stitutes "deprivation of all economic value," Justice Scalia looked to 
"the owner's reasonable expectations [ ... ] shaped by the State's law 
of property."64 In other words, the "degree the State's law has ac-
corded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in 
that government legislation to protect the health and safety or prevent noxious uses of property 
would preclude takings claims. Id. at 899. 
68 See LucaB, 505 U.S. at 1008. 
67 See id. at 1011. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
60 Id. at 1014; See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
81 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
62Id. 
63Id. at 1016. 
MId. at 1016 n.7. Justice Scalia does not define the threshold for discerning between partial 
diminishment of value and "total" regulatory takings. See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council: A Thngled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1374 (1993) 
(favoring compensation for partial takings). 
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land" serves as the criteria to evaluate the extent to which the owner 
was deprived of his interest in the land.65 
As to the justification for the rule that compensation is required 
when the owner is deprived of all economic use of the land, Justice 
Scalia noted that normal principles of deference to the government's 
regulatory efforts were invalid when such a serious deprivation oc-
curs.66 More important to the apparent justification was his anti-utili-
tarian argument that private individuals should not be pressed into 
serving the general public or common good through regulations on 
their land.67 
The remainder of Justice Scalia's opinion is dedicated to his rejec-
tion of the argument that the regulation in question could be justified 
as an instance of the state's use of its police powers to prevent public 
nuisances.68 The harmful or noxious use doctrine is simply "the pro-
genitor" of the Court's "SUbstantially advanc[ing] legitimate state 
interest" test.69 Employing his characteristic normative relativism, 
Justice Scalia next argued that what confers a benefit or imposes a 
burden will vary "in the eye of the beholder."70 As the Court could not 
determine whether a real harm exists, and because the regulation 
totally eliminated the economic value of the land, Justice Scalia rea-
soned, compensation is required.71 The only exception to such a com-
pensation requirement could arise in situations in which the owner's 
expectations could not have been defeated as the land was owned 
subject to background principles of nuisance and property law, which 
would have justified the taking in question.72 
The Lucas case continued the strict scrutiny analysis begun in 
Nollan. As Justice Scalia saw it, environmental regulations designed 
in the words of the legislature to "protect[] life and property . . . 
provide [a] habitat for numerous species of plants and animals [and] 
... provide[] a natural health environment for ... leisure time[,]"73 
should be subject to strict scrutiny when the regulation prohibits 
"economically viable use" of the land.74 Why the common law should 
65 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. 
66 See id. at 1026. 
67 See id. at 1018. 
68 See id. at 1020-21. 
69 [d. at 1023-24. 
70 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024-25. 
71 See id. at 1024-25, 1031-32. 
72 See id. at 1027, 1029. 
73 [d. at 1020 n.lO. 
74 [d. at 1020. Acceptance of the economic criteria for determining whether a taking has 
occurred has not been universal even among those approving of Lucas's holding. See, e.g., Daniel 
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furnish the only relevant background principles affecting a property 
owner's expectations is unstated.76 The Court failed to provide an 
argument justifying its limited consideration of the types of values or 
moral principles adhered to by a community. Would a community's 
commitment to strong environmentalism as an overarching norm al-
low a newcomer to simply ignore the community's will and expect 
compensation in the event a new regulation economically harmed 
them? It seems in Justice Scalia's relativistic refusal to actually judge 
the nature of the harm in question, he somehow succeeded in applying 
strict scrutiny to the regulation, thus exposing a thinly-veiled antipa-
thy to environmental regulation. 
D. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach 
Justice Scalia's apparent satisfaction with his Lucas opinion led him 
to write a dissent to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in 
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach.76 The Stevens purchased a parcel 
of land on the Oregon coastline in 1957 and sought a permit to build 
a seaway on the dry-sand portion of the property.77 In 1969, in Thorn-
ton v. Hay, the State of Oregon sought an injunction to prohibit 
beachfront property owners from building on the "dry-sand" portion 
of their property.78 On appeal from the grant of the injunction, the 
Supreme Court of Oregon held in Thornton that based on the "Eng-
lish doctrine of custom" a large area of land may be treated uniformly, 
which supported the right of the people of Oregon to use the beaches 
for recreational purposes.79 When certain property owners sued in 
1989 for a determination that property adjacent to their property 
included a dry-sand area, which would have provided access to the 
defendant's dry-sand beach,BO the plaintiffs argued that under the 
A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Campensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 279, 304--05 (1992) 
(arguing that the functional equivalence of a government acquisition ought to control the takings 
determination). 
76 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-29. It is not even clear what notion of expectations Justice 
Scalia intended to privilege. See Epstein, supra note 64, at 1370. Epstein notes the ambiguity 
in Justice Scalia's use of "investment-backed expectations" in some contexts and "reasonable 
expectations" in others. See id. This ambiguity is not without significance as Epstein explains, 
since adoption of one definition leads to privileging investment activity as opposed to the 
expectations of all owners of property. In his equivocation, Justice Scalia does offer some insight 
into the pro-business motivation for the decision. 
76 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (Mem.) (1994) (Scalia, J., and O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
77 See id. 
78 See id. (citing Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969». 
79 [d. (quoting Thornton, 462 P.2d at 676). 
80 See id. at 1209 (citing McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d 714 (Or. 1989». 
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doctrine of custom, defendant's property was public land.8! The Su-
preme Court of Oregon in McDonald v. Halvorson refused to recog-
nize that the doctrine of custom encompassed "the entire Oregon 
coast," and that the plaintiffs needed to show that the doctrine of 
custom applied to the parcel in question.82 
When the Stevens brought their suit for inverse condemnation to 
allow the building of the seawall, they argued that the holding in 
McDonald should have demonstrated that if they could prove their 
land was not subject to the custom concerning the dry-sand area, they 
should be permitted to build.83 The Stevens never were permitted to 
submit evidence regarding this custom, and the Supreme Court of 
Oregon relied on Thornton in holding that the historic use of the beach 
property by the public sufficed to demonstrate the existence of a 
custom.84 The highest court of Oregon, relying on Lucas, concluded 
that no taking could have occurred, as the custom prohibiting building 
on the dry-sand portion of the land was a background principle of 
property or nuisance law.86 Perhaps dismayed by this application of 
his Lucas opinion, Justice Scalia employed his newly-forged sword of 
strict scrutiny. In his Stevens dissent, he argued that if "it cannot 
fairly be said" that this doctrine of custom actually existed, a taking 
would have occurred.86 Nonetheless, because the determination of 
whether the doctrine of custom applied is factual in nature, Justice 
Scalia concluded that the Supreme Court could not consider the tak-
ings issues were it to hear the case on the merits.87 Instead, he sug-
gested that a due process argument might be appropriate as the 
Stevens were bound by the determination in Thornton to which they 
were not parties.83 
Given the fact that Stevens apparently implicates takings questions 
incidental to the Lucas opinion, it is somewhat unclear why the Court 
denied certiorari. Justice Scalia's colleagues may not share his appar-
ent desire to further cement his strict scrutiny analysis of state laws 
pertaining to ''background principles" or the regulations themselves. 
Alternatively, the articulation by the highest court of a state on an 
issue of state law may have dissuaded the other justices from granting 
81 See Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1209 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
8.2 See id. (citing McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d at 724) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
84 [d. at 1210 (Scalia, J. dissentng). 
85 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88 Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1212 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
87 [d. at 1213 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88 [d. at 1214 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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certiorari. Indeed, to the extent that a state supreme court is the most 
authoritative source regarding state law, Justice Scalia's suggestion 
that the invocation of the doctrine of custom was pretextual, as in 
Nollan, makes little sense. 
III. COMMUNITARIAN ApPROACHES TO PROPERTY RIGHTS 
In developing a communitarian vision of property rights, I will 
consider a number of contemporary theorists. Each theorist offers 
insights upon which one may reevaluate real property rights along 
communitarian grounds. These competing communitarian visions may 
provide some insight into the type of communitarian theory needed 
to explain the role of property in civil society. In so doing, I will 
explicate a conception of property as rooted in a community.89 
A. Ronald Dworkin~ Rights-Based Communitarianism 
In Law's Empire, Ronald Dworkin advances a complete jurispru-
dential theory.90 For the purposes of this Essay, attention will be paid 
to the communitarian elements in the theory, while leaving aside his 
more global claims. One should recognize that Dworkin invokes com-
munitarian arguments most notably in arguing for the moral obliga-
tion to obey the law.91 Nonetheless, his arguments for communitari-
anism in this context can be usefully applied in determining the 
pro-per scope of property rights. 
Dworkin's appeal to communitarian justifications to support the 
legitimacy of state coercion through law is rather unorthodox. In 
contrast to the traditional assumption that law itself imposes an inde-
pendent moral duty of obedience, Dworkin argues that our ties to 
others within a community compel us to follow the rules of that 
community. Dworkin suggests that associative or communal obliga-
tions which bind us to a group compel us to respect and follow the 
law: "I mean the special responsibilities social practice attaches to 
membership in some biological or social group, like the responsibilities 
89 The determination of the meaning of property must occur prior to the determination of 
what constitutes a taking. As Frederick Schauer has noted, arguments based on the text of the 
Constitution may be entitled to no more weight than arguments about our conception of 
property. The question of property, and its function in preserving community, thus remains 
logically and philosophically prior to the question of just compensation. Frederick Schauer, 
Property as Politics, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 60, 64 (1990). 
90 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1987). 
91 Dworkin views the moral obligation to obey the law as "close to a necessary condition" in 
order to justify state coercion (i.e., law). See id. at 191. 
844 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:831 
of family or friends or neighbors. Most people think that they have 
associative obligations just by belonging to groups defined by social 
practice .... "92 In other words, Dworkin alludes to a moral obligation 
to obey the law based on ties to one's community and individuals 
within that community. Here, he sounds quite like Hegel and his 
notion of Sittlichkeit or ethicallife.93 
Dworkin further argues that our associative obligations are gener-
ally considered most important. "[F]or most people, responsibilities to 
family and lovers and friends and union or office colleagues are the 
most important and most consequential obligations of all."94 This 
seems to ring true. Indeed, the notion of justice within political phi-
losophy as concerned with rights and duties bears little importance 
to our everyday lives. Pacts, agreements and responsibilities we have 
with others are much more frequently the source of moral dilemmas 
than are moral principles upheld by the government. Dworkin justi-
fies this argument by recourse to an interpretive methodology where-
by he uncovers principles of morality embedded in the structure of 
society. These principles or norms of communities can be argued about 
and objectively understood, from within the group. 
"[T]he concepts we use to describe these groups and to claim or 
reject these obligations are interpretive concepts; people can sensibly 
argue in the interpretive way about what friendship really is and 
about what children really owe their parents in old age.''95 
The question he begs here is whether we interpret the traditions 
of our particular community like Michael Walzer does96 or whether we 
make reference to some universal or Western notion of justice. From 
the context of his argument in Law's Empire, it would seem to be the 
former.97 
WId. at 196. 
93 See generally G.W.F. HEGEL, SYSTEM OF ETHICAL LIFE (H.S. Harris & T.M. Knox trans.) 
(1979). For a discussion and explanation of the notion of Sittlichkeit, see Jurgen Habermas, 
Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics, in MORAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 195 (trans. Christian Lenhardt & Shierry W. 
Nicholsen 1990). 
94 DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 196. 
95 Id. at 197. 
96 See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY (1983). Walzer argues that justice takes place in different "spheres," or in Wittgen-
stinian terms, "language games," which determine the elements of justice within that context. 
See id. at 61-63. Different contexts will support different substantive notions of justice. Walzer 
is a relativist of sorts. Yet his claim about spheres is universal, insofar as he believes that every 
sphere will embody different notions of justice. 
97 Dworkin has criticized Walzer on what appears to be more modernist grounds: ''Walzer's 
relativism is faithless to the single most important social practice we have: the practice of 
1998] ESSAY 845 
While confident that these communal ties bind us, Dworkin argues 
that persons need not explicitly consent to membership in these com-
munities on the grounds that many of the obligations which arise are 
infrequently the objects of choice.98 I do not choose my brother, yet 
few would doubt that my obligations to my brother are greater than 
to a stranger. In other words, the moral obligations that communities 
create are not the result of some social contract. Yet, neither are they 
fully transcendent. Were they fully transcendent, it seems unlikely 
that we would be speaking of communal obligations at all. Dworkin 
argues that communal obligations arise within a group simply by 
virtue of one's participation in group activities.99 
While Dworkin wants to preserve a non-normative dimension to 
the notion of community to leave room for differences in social rela-
tions, he resorts to certain normative requirements which serve as 
conditions for the possibility of a community. Specifically, he articu-
lates four basic principles which may be considered a priori conditions 
for a group necessary to generate responsibilities between members. 
The first two principles simply define the domain of the group: the 
members of the group must consider the group's obligations as "spe-
cial" or limited to the group as well as "personal" which tie all mem-
bers of the group to one another.lOO These are constitutive principles. 
Additionally, he calls for two substantive principles, which infuse the 
group with certain moral qualities. First, "members must see these 
responsibilities as flowing from a more general responsibility each has 
of concern for the well being of others in the group .... "101 This 
principle sounds quite like the notion of "equal concern and respect" 
he developed in Taking Rights Seriously.10? Not surprisingly, the sec-
ond substantive principle suggests that "the group's practices show 
not only concern but an equal concern for all members."H13 These 
principles enable us to distinguish between a ''bare'' community (e.g. 
where people merely live among themselves) and a "true" community, 
embodying these substantive moral ideals. 
worrying about what justice really is." RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 219 (1985). 
In other words, in this passage, Dworkin views justice as objective and rationally ascertainable, 
rather than merely a product of social interaction. It is unclear whether the later work in LAw'S 
EMPIRE departs from this universalistic approach. 
98 DWORKIN, 8Upra note 90, at 197. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. at 200. 
100 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977). 
103 DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 200. 
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The principles announced by Dworkin give rise to a political com-
munity, from which a moral obligation to obey the law (or underpin-
ning of property rights) might arise.104 Dworkin seems to think that 
based on these four principles, we can interpret the nature of jus-
tice in the particular community. Such standards constitute localized 
norms of the community. The transcendent notion of justice only 
establishes a necessary condition for a community, without making a 
universalistic claim regarding all societies. Dworkin understands the 
importance of Sittlichkeit, but fails to abandon his desire for some sort 
of universal principles. 
B. Roberto Unger and The Critical Legal Studies Communitarian 
Vision 
Roberto Unger, the intellectual paragon of the Critical Legal Stud-
ies movement, has developed a comprehensive critique of liberalism 
while offering a program of action to avoid the alleged limitations of 
traditionalliberalism.105 Unger's thought is wide-ranging and attempt-
ing a general analysis of his work is outside the scope of this Essay. 
Accordingly, I will focus primarily on those aspects of his work involv-
ing his notion of a community of solidarity and its possible applications 
to considerations of property rights. 
In advancing his political theory, Unger confronts liberalism's tra-
ditional rights-oriented conception of law and attempts to move be-
yond this approach to foster the development of communities.1°O Ac-
104 Some theorists have argued that Dworkin intends to transform the nature ofthe sovereign 
by an organic fusion of individuals to the state. The community and the state become unified: 
Like the sovereign, the state understood on the model of integrity is a single moral 
agent that is the source of the law. The community as sovereign, however, is neither 
the people themselves understood as prior to the state, nor an entity-e.g., king or 
parliament-that is distinct from the people themselves. Rather Dworkin's sover-
eignty is the people as the state. The closest parallel in the history of political theory 
is Rousseau's concept of the "general will," which is the whole of the state but not the 
aggregate of individuals who constitute the state. 
Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.1. 1,72 (1989). 
Although this vision may seem somewhat utopian, it may at least function as a regulatory ideal 
to which we should strive. By minimizing the alienation of members of society from the state 
we may best uphold the notion of political equality. 
105 For a general discussion of Unger's general political and philosophical stance, see generally 
ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1983) [hereinafter CLS]. See 
also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 64-74 (1987) (discussing Unger's 
rejection of dualistic aspects of liberal theory which posit a strong distinction between facts and 
values or reason and desire). 
106 Unger, CLS, supra note 105, at 36. 
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cordingly, Unger claims that the established system of rights in our 
contemporary political system lacks legal principles or entitlements 
which support the development of communitiesYI7 Unger considers 
communities to be ''those areas of social existence where people stand 
in a relationship of heightened mutual vulnerability and responsibility 
to each other."108 Unger's critique of rights involves a recognition that 
rights provide right holders unfettered discretion to exercise rights, 
thereby distorting the individuals' ties to other community mem-
bers.loo According to Unger, our attachment to rights involves an 
attempt to insulate ourselves from the broader society and prevents 
participation in the "give-and-take of communal life and its charac-
teristic concern for the actual effect of any decision upon the other 
person."110 
Unger's criticism of rights highlights an undesirable or unintended 
consequence of rights. Rights are trumps over the majority will; by 
definition they involve an attempt to shield individuals from the in-
trusion of social forces.111 Indeed, as Dworkin suggests, such insula-
tion may be necessary to maintain one's membership in a commu-
nity.ll2 As Unger argues, however, rights also can effectively remove 
the individual from a community, insofar as rights are enforced 
against the community. Unger attempts to reconcile these competing 
tendencies through a general communitarian theory. 
Toward this end, Unger reconceives the legal system as providing 
a conduit for communal development, which must be read against a 
background of an empowered democracy. Within the liberating demo-
cratic system he envisions, interpersonal relations are freed from "the 
constraints of a background plan of social division and hierarchy."n8 
Once the society realizes a "recombination of qualities and experi-
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
110 [d. But see generally Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Tragedy and Complacency, 81 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 693 (1987) (noting that Unger's emphasis on the self as context transcending or continually 
recreated suffers criticisms from other communitarians for "radical individualism"). Nonethe-
less, the individualist strand in Unger's thought is not an end in itself, and serves only to allow 
the full development of community through transformative movement based on individual will. 
111 See generally DWORKIN, supra note 102. 
112 See DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 211-14. 
113 Unger, CLS, supra note 105, at 37. Unger's poststructuralism recognizes that since certain 
"reified patterns of living" determine the possibilities for existence, humans must reconstruct 
the social world in the hopes of creating new categories and institutions which affirm the human 
good. See Cornell, supra note 110, at 695. 
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ences associated with different social roles," the new foundation for a 
community must be made concrete in the form of "legal categories 
and protected [ ... ] legal rights," thus establishing permanently "in-
stitutional support" for these newly realized social relations.u4 Ac-
cordingly, Unger's newly conceived formal basis for community with-
in a spirit of solidarity requires a simultaneous substantive change in 
the allocation of entitlements and material resources. 
Unger sees traditional legal rights to property as constituting a 
significant obstacle to the creation of a community of solidarity.u6 
Property rights lie at the root of our failure to establish communal 
principles in the law: "[t]he consolidated property right had to be a 
zone of absolute discretion. In this zone the rightholder could avoid 
any tangle of claims to mutual responsibility. It was natural that this 
conception of right should extend to all rights."u6 To deal with the 
negative effects of "social division and hierarchy" involved in tradi-
tionallegal thought, Unger argues for four basic rights which provide 
for freedom from domination by society, while promoting the devel-
opment of community.ll7 
The first category of rights are immunity rights, which provide 
an absolute zone of freedom from the state and others.u8 Immunity 
rights seem roughly equivalent to the traditional Anglo-American 
conception of rights. Second are "destabilization rights" which allow 
for shaking up existing social orders to "disrupt established institu-
tions" which tend to entrench "social hierarchy and division" his whole 
project is designed to avoid.ll9 Thirdly, Unger views market rights as 
a form of entitlement, which provides persons with "divisible portions 
of social capital."12o Finally, and most important to his theory, he posits 
solidarity rights of communal life which create legal claims to expec-
tations generated through the myriad of social relations.121 As hybrid 
claims, solidarity rights are not the intentional creation of the state 
114 Unger, CLS, supra note 105, at 37. 
116 See id. at 38. Property rights, on Unger's analysis, are as much to blame in the lack of 
communal development as is the failure of the legal system itself to encompass community, "the 
absence of legal principles and categories suited to communal life turns out to be as much the 
surprising by-product of the legal form given to the market as the consequence of an inability 
to assimilate existing forms of community to the ruling visions of society." Id. 
116Id. 
117 See id. at 39. 
118 See id. 
119 See Unger, CLS, supra note 105, at 39. 
120 See id. 
121Id. at 39-40. 
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or of individual Will.122 Accordingly, the solidarity right evolves from 
standards of "good-faith loyalty and responsibility" which gain con-
crete form when the right holders establish boundaries to the exercise 
of rights to prevent injury to someone. l23 
Unger's development of the notion of solidarity rights provides a 
basis to reconceive the relation of individuals within a community to 
each other and to the state.124 He bases such reconception of individual 
relations to the community within a comprehensive theory of the self 
and the good. Under a "theory of organic groups," Unger envisions a 
basis for constructing a new social order.125 Community, in Unger's 
writings, involves a complex array of principles and ideals, yet ulti-
mately leads him to consider the means by which the theoretical 
construct may become instantiated in social life.126 
The chief object of his theory of community involves the determi-
nation of what "sympathetic social relations would look like and thus 
to describe the political equivalent of love."127 Although an unconven-
tional statement of political theory, Unger's advocacy of sympathy as 
an "institutional principle" of the group resembles Dworkin's notion of 
equal concern and respect.128 This principle requires members to treat 
others as having complementary rather than antagonistic aims.129 The 
second principle requires members of the group to subjectively expe-
rience shared communal values which furnish grounds by which the 
members of the group relate to each other as well as providing a basis 
for individual actions representative of the communal order.130 Finally, 
the ideals of "[n]atural harmony, sympathy, and concrete universal-
ity"13l must be implemented into the daily working life of the members 
of the groUp.132 Together these principles provide a program for plac-
ing communitarian virtues at the basis of society. The norms require 
individuals to act with community values in mind. Here, Unger de-
122 See id. at 40. 
123 See id. 
124 See generally ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975). 
125 See id. at 236-95. 
126 See id. at 261. 
127 [d. 
128 See id.; DWORKIN, supra note 102, at 198-99. 
129 See UNGER, supra note 124, at 261. 
130 [d. 
131 [d. Concrete universality is the means by which individual members of the group see 
themselves as members of the wider species of humanity, thus furthering the ethical move to 
sympathy. 
132 [d. 
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parts from the liberal tradition which he criticizes. The place of indi-
vidual responsibility is tempered, however, by the creation of legal 
rights which facilitate the development of communal virtues.l33 It is 
simultaneously a top down and bottom up theory. 1M 
Unger's critique of traditional property rights as exclusionary 
claims which allow individuals to separate themselves from the larger 
society highlights the need for new theoretical underpinnings for real 
property law to create true social solidarity and communal develop-
ment. The place of real property rights within the legal structure 
furnishing the basis for communal development requires further elu-
cidation. Most significant among his communitarian contribution is his 
claim that members of the group must subjectively see other mem-
bers sympathetically and his arguments in favor of minimizing the 
tendency of strong property rights to undermine democratic solidar-
ity. 
C. Environmental Ethics Based on a Community of Virtue 
Eric Freyfogle's Justice and the Earth advances an environmental 
ethic, which places a normative constraint on property ownership in 
land.13G Although a law professor by trade, Freyfogle's apparent im-
petus for the work was based on his own understanding of nature 
gained through his own property ownership in rural Illinois.l36 Ac-
cordingly, his work in this book does not constitute painstaking analy-
183 Michael Walzer's communitarianism may be helpful in illustrating this point. Walzer's 
theory envisions two moments in which community is actualized: the moral community and the 
legal community. William A. Galston, Community, Democracy, Philosophy: The Political 
Thought of Michael Walzer, 17 POL. THEORY 119, 120--21 (1989). The moral community conjoins 
individuals around their "shared understandings of social goods," while the legal community 
involves the combination of individuals who "through specific acts of consent ... create and 
delimit sovereign authority." [d. Unlike Walzer, though, Unger does not posit the congruence 
of these two forms of community. For Unger, this form of community can only arise through 
the agonistic process of political discourse and evolution. See UNGER, supra note 124, at 261-62. 
184 This result is similar to the theory of legitimacy developed in Jurgen Habermas' recent 
work. See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DIS-
COURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 408 (1996). Habermas conceives of a system of 
rights supporting individual autonomy as securing the conditions for democracy and as simul-
taneously supported by such democratic political system: "A legal order is legitimate to the 
extent that it equally secures the co-original private and political autonomy of its citizens; at 
the same time, however, it owes its legitimacy to the forms of communication in which alone this 
autonomy can express and prove 
itself." [d. 
185 See generally ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, JUSTICE AND THE EARTH (1993). 
136 See id. at 1-17. 
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ses of Supreme Court precedents but instead furnishes an argument 
for a reconception of traditional notions of property rights.137 
Freyfogle first criticizes economists and legal theorists for the tra-
ditional property law view that land is a permanent asset.138 Land, 
unlike fixed assets such as plant and equipment, gradually depletes.139 
Freyfogle notes that non-renewable resources are gradually depleted, 
thus requiring accounting practice to recognize this fact on corporate 
balance sheets.14o Land is treated as a permanent asset, not reflective 
of the physical reality.141 By accounting for land differently, we might 
provide an incentive for less exploitation.l42 
His second main criticism is the tendency of property owners to 
fully exploit land under their control.143 Agricultural, mining, and tim-
ber companies attempt to achieve maximum returns on their land 
with no incentive to protect the environment beyond their own land. l44 
Calculations of profits and losses may allow the property owner to 
reap profits over a number of years, yet might leave the land worth-
less when finished. l45 Freyfogle's argument thus directly opposes the 
Chicago School's complacent assumption that self-interest ultimately 
will provide sufficient constraints to prevent overuse.146 It is this lack 
of incentive for owners of land to account for the wider interestsl47 of 
137 See generally id. Freyfogle considers the reigning real property law to have gained a clear 
explication in Blackstone. Eric T. Freyfogle, Ouming the Wolf' Green Politics: Property Rights, 
Ecology Rights, DISSENT, Fall 1994, at 481-82. Traditional English common law treated prop-
erty as complete domination over the land. Our legal understanding of property involves an 
"image of a physical world divided into pieces and subject to private ownership and control, a 
countryside populated with castles, each which an owner who controls." FREYFOGLE, supra 
note 135, at 51. Property owners could thus freely use their land for whatever purpose they 
deemed proper. In modern times, this regime creates counter-intuitive results, as environmen-
talism has highlighted the need to consider property ownership as necessarily having an impact 
on the wider society. 
138 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 135, at 23-26. 
139 See id. at 25. 
140 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 135, at 25. 
141 See id. at 25. 
142 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 135, at 25-26. 
143 See id. at 31. 
144 See id. at 29. 
145 See id. at 31. 
146 See id. at 19-43. 
147 Note that by using the term "interest" I do not intend to anthropomorphize nature. Joel 
Feinburg's instrumental understanding of an interest appears closest to my true meaning. See 
JOEL FEINBURG, HARM TO OTHERS 33 (1984) ("If I have an interest ... I have a kind of stake 
in [a thing's] well-being."). 
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the environment that leads Freyfogle to consider this another exam-
ple of the tragedy of the commons.148 
Freyfogle's third argument focuses on externalities, defined as "ac-
tivities that impose harms or benefits on others with no compensation 
paid to equalize the situation."149 Indeed, as the example of wetlands 
shows, the impact on biodiversity and ecological systems does not 
become part of the calculation of harms and benefits.l50 Dumping toxic 
wastes into a river might be a clear case of nuisance and an infringe-
ment on health and safety161 but concern for species preservation and 
harms to persons who might live thousands of miles away are incom-
pletely calculated.l62 
Finally, Freyfogle explains that "free markets" are imperfect to the 
extent that competition tends to discourage preservation and privi-
leges the unethical equally with the ethical.l63 Confronting the liber-
tarianism of free market adherents, Freyfogle notes that individuals 
must be given an incentive to do right, or else an incoherent and 
incomplete system will develop. 1M Freyfogle considers economic ap-
proaches to land as out of sync with his own experience of land 
inhabited by living and breathing animals and beautiful flora. l66 The 
148 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 135, at 27. 
[d. 
Many observers believe that this common-pool story with its tragic conclusion captures 
a good part of our environmental predicament. Their suggestion is that too many of 
our resources are held and used in common, which prompts users to abuse. Our air is 
a common asset, and factories pollute it, in part because the costs of polluted air are 
shared with all who must breathe it. Many of our groundwater aquifers are declining 
rapidly and will soon face exhaustion, again because use is communal and each pumper 
has no incentive to be the one to stop. 
149 [d. at 3~3. 
160 [d. at 35-86. 
151 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
152 See FREYFOGLE, 8Upra note 135, at 37-38. 
[d. 
By remedying only identifiable harm to people, we ignore everything that we cannot 
sense, cannot trace, cannot value, and cannot wait to experience. We also ignore the 
interests of generations to come, since compensation paid today provides them with 
nothing. We have no way oflmowing, for example, what benefits might have come from 
the many species that we exterminate each day. This problem of undervaluation (or 
nonvaluation) becomes more extreme when we depart from our anthropocentrism and 
recognize intrinsic value in other life forms and ecosystems. These harms, too, will go 
undervalued unless and until we somehow add to our externalities analysis new, far 
broader definition of harm. 
153 [d. at 39-42. 
154 [d. at 41. 
. 155 See id. at 43. 
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answer to this conundrum accordingly requires a "gather[ing] as a 
community to set rules for communal conduct."l56 Public discourse, as 
opposed to free market individualism, may foster "a public, shared, 
and more lasting morality."167 Only an ethic of the environment, as 
opposed to ownership of property, can make proper sense of the 
competing claims. 
Freyfogle entitles this moral principle an "ethic of care."l68 Such an 
ethic requires each successive generation to recognize that responsi-
bility over the earth's resources rests with themselves. Preservation 
only occurs when "the cares of many people go beyond the self-cen-
tered and the economic."169 In this vein, Freyfogle seems to adopt a 
notion of collective virtue, like Rousseau's common good, which calls 
each of us to do right in the interest of the community. No matter how 
the distribution of land proceeds, no matter what the boundaries are, 
without a shared morality of care for the environment, individual land 
owners will "want to cut into the principal," which will eventually 
"hurt those who come later."160 Under Freyfogle's theory, the relevant 
moral community includes not only persons living, but future genera-
tions as well. The duty to protect the environment for future genera-
tions is not without problems though, as Freyfogle notes that we 
cannot know the preferences of these people or determine how much 
weight to afford such preferences when weighed against our own.161 
Nonetheless, the appeal of this notion is intuitive.l62 It intuitively may 
be considered part of virtuous character, like honesty and kindness. l63 
Freyfogle understands the foundational limitations and imprecision of 
such a norm, yet invokes it as a "plea for life and for opportunity, a 
plea for us to be stewards, temporary custodians for a rightful owner 
who will one day return for an accounting."l64 Freyfogle's attenuated 
[d. 
I am still at a loss on pricing the red-tailed hawks, the flickers, and the meadow voles 
that have their competing deeds to my land. Dollars, it seems to me, are for people, 
and dollar numbers respond to transient, fluctuating, human concerns. Am I wrong to 
sense, as I do, that the land somehow is above this pettiness of prices, that it has, or 
should have, a stability of value that dollars can never have? 
156 [d. at 41. 
167 Freyfogle, supra note 135, at 42. 
168 [d. at 31. 
169 [d. at 31-32. 
160 [d. at 32. 
161 See id. at 87-88. 
162 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 135, at 89. 
163 See id. 
164 [d. 
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theoretical discussions in this book may require further explication 
and analysis. His critique of traditional property rights helps to dem-
onstrate the shortcomings of individualism in the environmental age. 
The argument does not offer a clear-cut alternative definition of prop-
erty or of rights in property, but suggests the adoption of new ethical 
norms which fully recognize the impact private decisions might have 
on persons within the broader society and the world. His aspirational 
arguments resemble altruistic importunings, rather than normative 
advocacy of legal and public policy changes. Moreover, in his analysis 
of future generations, Freyfogle implicitly broadens the relevant mor-
al community to include living persons and those to come. Once soci-
ety dispenses with the notion of property as absolute domination over 
land, the grounds for seeing communal obligations posed by property 
ownership may become more apparent. 
III. ToWARD A COMMUNITARIAN UNDERSTANDING OF REAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The arguments of Dworkin, Unger, and Freyfogle contribute some-
thing unique to a theory of property rights which entails communal 
obligations. Each has a different project. Dworkin seeks to develop a 
coherent interpretation of Anglo-American legal systems he consid-
ers basically just. Unger seeks a transformative, empancipatory de-
mocracy which will liberate individuals while creating a more just 
society. Finally, Freyfogle wants to reconstruct our understanding of 
our relationship to the natural world in the hope of realizing true 
environmental protection. While each theorist comes from completely 
different philosophical traditions, they manifest consistency in their 
understanding of individuals' relations to communities and the need 
to develop a political theory supportive of communities. Moreover, 
there appears to be some basic understanding of the respective roles 
of communities and the legal system in creating space for communal 
development.l65 Accordingly, this section will articulate an under-
165 All three theorists seem to recognize the need for some sort of reciprocity between the 
members of the group. This type of condition for establishment of a community has been termed 
one of "mutuality." See Lawrence C. Becker, Community, Dominion, and Membership, 30 So. 
J. PHIL. 17,20 (1992) (defining "extent to which members of the group recognize themselves 
and each other as members of the group, make and recognize reciprocal contributions to each 
others' lives, have a common understanding of the nature of the group, and have univalent 
esponses to it and to each other.") Such communal ties simultaneously require respect for the 
community by the individual and respect for the individual by the community. 
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standing of real property rights which involves a commitment to com-
munity, relying on some of the philosophical observations of Dwor-
kin, Unger, and Freyfogle. 
Determining the role of community in defining property rights is 
similar to the classic utilitarianism versus rights debate. Utilitarian-
ism is often criticized for allowing one individual's rights to be sac-
rificed for the benefit of the many.l66 Moreover, utilitarianism is fre-
quently rejected for its inability to treat the individual as having an 
independent moral value. Alternatively, rights-based theories make 
individual rights foundational, thereby avoiding the conflict between 
an individual's rights and society's preferences.l67 Rights-based theo-
ries have been criticized for failing to give the community any power 
over the individual. 
Essentially the debate over the Takings Clause involves the same 
concerns. As Justice Scalia discussed in the Lucas opinion, an individ-
ual ought not be sacrificed to uphold a community's preferences for a 
particular regulation.l68 This Essay has sought to illustrate how the 
community's right to adopt a scheme under which its members will 
live cannot be squared with strong real property rights. In either 
case, the question is somewhat paradoxical: property rights are es-
sential to preserving individual autonomy from communal intrusions, 
yet when taken too far, paraphrasing Justice Holmes, they undermine 
the development of the community which the grant of individual 
rights was intended to safeguard.l69 As the theorists discussed in this 
Essay suggest, while some societies might function adequately with 
strong property rights (roughly understood as Lucas's holding), in a 
society seeking to become more than an associative communityl70 or 
166 See generally RG. Frey, ed., UTILITY AND RIGHTS (1984). 
167 [d. 
168 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992). 
169 This concept can be found in the writings of Hume. See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM 
AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 102 (1986). Postema discusses Hume's political philosophy 
and argues that "Hume's substantive view is that social order and stability, and thus the 
possibility of all social intercourse, rest on the foundation of stable possession of material goods." 
[d. But Postema also notes that Hume understands "property to underwrite and structure all 
social relations, positions, and conditions." [d. Such a theory seems to recognize the need for 
society to be careful in allocating property rights in the hope of ensuring harmonious social 
relations, which might be made more difficult if property rights are allocated unequally. 
170 See DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 209 (describing a "de facto" community where the mem-
bers happen to inhabit the same geographic location but share none of the same characteristics, 
common heritage or values). 
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assemblage of individuals, such a conception of property rights may 
disrupt social harmony. 
Putting the question in terms of Dworkin's work, although some 
property rights are necessary to prevent majoritarian abuses and 
may form the conditions for the possibility of a community, under 
what conditions ought the claims of property owners yield to the 
majority?171 The place of environmental regulations may illustrate 
how to treat the competing claims. 
To begin with, property rights form the foundation of a market for 
land. One acquires property in land subject to certain encumbrances, 
such as zoning laws, and certain ''background principles" of nuisance 
and other clear harm-preventing rules.172 Such rules are part of the 
rights which form the basis of the market, much like the rules of 
language form the basis of a "language game."I73 As a socially con-
structed "game" the rights and the rules of the game are a matter of 
social and political stipulation rather than objectively determined 
171 In Dworkin's terms such a conflict is one of principle, or right claims, versus policy, or 
utilitarian claims. See DWORKIN, supra note 102, at 82-84. 
172 Although not considered in Justice Scalia's Lucas opinion, the relevant encumbrances and 
background principles which might define one's "reasonable investment backed expectations" 
could be precisely the interest of the community in ensuring a healthy environment, biological 
diversity or preservation of land for its own sake. Frank Michelman observes that persons 
frequently purchase property with at least a "tacit understanding" that "society reserves the 
right to preempt exploitation of a certain narrowly described class of resources at any time, and 
that no one is to form any inconsistent expectations about the future use and control of those 
resources." Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations oJ"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1240 (1967). This Essay has 
sought to show that rather than subsisting in the background, such principles define the 
property rights themselves. 
173 See generally LUDWIG WI'ITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. An-
scombe ed., 1953). Wittgenstein discusses rules of chess as an example of the function of rules 
in any use of language. Although the rules form the basis of play in the game, the rules also 
function to, in a sense, define the game itself, "if a rule of the game prescribes that the kings 
are to be used for drawing lots before a game of chess, then that is an essential part of the 
game." [d. § 567. In the legal system, the rules and regulations prescribing proper play consti-
tute the game itself. Since the rules of any game are the result of stipulation, arguments that 
any change of the rules governing property ownership would change the "free market" are 
simply truisms, and cannot be given conclusive weight. Indeed, as Lyotard argues, the rules of 
a given language game are not self-legitimizing, but instead devolve from a contract between 
the players of the game. See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A 
REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 10 (1984). Justification on such an understanding comes not from 
appeals to the game itself or the rules defining the game but "consists in appealing to something 
independent." WITTGENSTEIN, § 265. The burden thus falls on those who seek to retain the 
current conception of property rights to justify their position by virtue of some independent, 
higher order principle which explains why the rules governing real property include some rules 
yet exclude others. 
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ideals. These stipulated rules, rather than derivative of the game or 
market, are actually constitutive of the institution itself.174 
How we conceptualize the market for real property within this 
framework will effect our understanding of the role of community. 
One can propose a number of competing hypotheses concerning the 
balance of communal interests and individual rights. On the one hand, 
rules supporting property rights could be stricken from the game 
when detrimental to the community. Such a theory would conceive of 
property rights as having mere prima facie validity rather than as 
having some inviolable status. Property rights would then yield to 
communal concerns when expedient. In practice, such a theory could 
break down into a mere utilitarian system in which rights had no 
independent status. Alternatively, the communitarian basis of prop-
erty law could wholly supplant the traditional rights-duties dichotomy 
in property law making the interests of the community paramount. 
On such a theory, property rights would be viewed as wholly subsidi-
ary to communal concerns. The chief organizing principle of such a 
system would involve a commitment to fostering community perhaps 
at the expense of individual rights. Both possible theories are unac-
ceptable. While possibly compatible with Freyfogle's environmental 
ethic, they are incompatible with a community built on rights as 
envisioned by Dworkin and Unger. 
Dworkin and Unger are united on some basic level in their belief 
that law can support communal development. Although Unger con-
ceives of a more activist, transformative democracy, both thinkers see 
rights as an essential component to the development of community. 
Within Unger's work, however, a more critical view of rights emerges. 
Rights-particularly property rights- instead of supporting commu-
nities, may tend to undermine them. Unger's critique of the rights 
holder as capable of removing himself from the "tangle of claims to 
mutual responsibility" illustrates an undesirable side-effect of rights. 
174 This constituitive role of rules in a game is analogous to the role of the regulatory state in 
preserving a mechanism for preference formation. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 41-73 (1990), (describing the "facilitative function" of regulations in ensuring 
proper mediation and appropriate weight given to private preferences and the public interest). 
Indeed, as Sunstein notes, rules (and regulations) which limit the activities of private actors 
may be the only means of ensuring that public concerns are not undermined by the activities 
of individual actors in the free market. See id. at 43. For Sunstein, the importance of the 
regulatory state is to prevent the tendency of the market, if unchecked, to frustrate the 
collective preferences of the individuals in the group. See id. at 41-42; see also LYOTARD, supra 
note 171, at (noting that "where there are no rules, there is no game"). 
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Here, Unger foreshadows Freyfogle's reconception of property 
rights. The problem becomes one not of redefining the formal rules of 
the game itself but of reimagining the substantive nature of property 
rights, forming the basis upon which transactions within the market 
are executed. 
The three writers discussed in this Essay provide a basis for recon-
structing property rights by synthesizing communal ties and individ-
ual ownership claims. If communal concerns (such as environmental 
protection) are seen as already built into the notion of property rights, 
the situation in which property rights trump communal concerns or 
vice versa is eliminated. The choice becomes one not between a mar-
ket system based solely on transactions of individual ownership claims 
and some system of communal ownership of property, but instead 
between the unfettered market operating separate from the needs of 
the community and a market situated within and shaped by communal 
concerns. The latter formulation requires communal concerns to re-
ceive standing as part of any analysis of real property ownership, as 
the property rights themselves may be seen as entailing a communi-
tarian element. The ownership claim which is traded in the market 
for land will necessarily involve a communitarian component on this 
analysis. 
This understanding opposes current takings law in which communal 
concerns are strictly scrutinized to determine whether such concerns 
are sufficiently important, as in the case of regulations concerning the 
environment.175 The view proposed here does not amount to communal 
ownership of property, but simply a recognition that the ownership 
of property directly implicates obligations incurred through member-
ship in a community.176 In this way, Unger's concern about the ten-
dency of rights to insulate the individual from the community is 
176 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1992). 
176 Accordingly, arguments regarding the tragedy of the commons and "common pools" of 
property are unavailing, as such arguments assume that communal responsibility entails com-
munal ownership. See Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 
1236-38 (1979). One might rightly argue that the community has an interest in preserving the 
environment and thereby has a right to a clean environment, thus precluding individual land 
owners from using their land so as to undermine the community's interest in the land outside 
the particular parcel an individual owns. Understanding the public interest in the environment 
does not, however, create an equivalent countervailing right of the public as in the case of public 
lands. See Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering 
Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 
515 (1994). Instead it means affording communal concerns a permanent status in any analysis 
of real property rights. 
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minimized. Moreover, it may reduce the danger of the market frus-
trating the collective preferences of society.177 
Such a reconception of property rights would reject the creation of 
an insurance scheme under the guise of the Takings Clause178 to cover 
all burdensome regulations. Such an insurance scheme tends to create 
an antagonistic relationship between individuals and communities by 
making societal public policy choices subject to individual economic 
interests.179 It also may prevent the compromise of the community's 
ability to govern itself to the extent that within the current paradigm 
discourse is undermined by an excessive preoccupation with rights 
claimsl80 and the realm of possible political questions itself has become 
177 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 172, at 41-42. 
178 Overgenerous compensation schemes may actually produce disutilitarian results insofar as 
investors may ''play the market" by taking certain risks with the expectation of receiving 
compensation should certain events occur. See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Com-
pensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 279, 284-85 (1992). While some adjustments may be made 
which would limit investors' recoveries, such adjustments can only be made post hoc and would 
be prone to arbitary and subjective determinations, creating a compensation scheme both 
underinclusive and overinclusive. 
179 The anomaly arises from the competing nature of rights in takings cases. While requiring 
just compensation to the landowner clearly furthers the rights of the individual, the individual 
is simultaneously undermining some right of the community to, for instance, regulate its 
environment. Accordingly, the individual right to just compensation changes the relationship of 
the individual to the community. Just compensation allows land owners to force economic 
concerns into relationships previously immune to such factors. This increasing tendency to 
demand compensation from the community "has extended the instrumental relationships of the 
market-place into spheres previously informed by a sense of uncalculated reciprocity and civic 
obligation." Daniel A. Bell, Together Again? N.Y. TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Nov. 25,1994, 
at 5 (reviewing Amitai Etzioni's book THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY (1994)). 
180 See Mark 'fushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23, 32 (1993) (noting that the 
rhetorical force of rights tends to create a climate in which compromise becomes impossible). 
When both the majority and the minority assert claims of right and "counter-right," the ability 
to deliberate and sort out the respective claims tends to be undermined, as each side views their 
claim to require absolute deference to their claim. See id. Indeed, when "rights" claims are given 
conclusive determination, they become permanent fixtures, which create "winners" and ''losers'' 
well into the future. See id. Alasdair MacIntyre similarly condemns the counterproductive 
nature of rights rhetoric. He invokes Aristotle to support his claim that without some shared 
understanding of the human good arising from membership in a community, rational inquiry in 
politics, ethics and practical affairs would be impossible. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, COMMUNITY, 
LAW, AND THE IDIOM AND RHETORIC OF RIGHTS 96 (19xx). Such shared understandings may 
arise through two plans of action: 
First, we need to restore the centrality of a conception of justice in the light of which 
we can formulate concerns about both desert and needs, in terms of an overall concep-
tion of a type of community once again informed by a shared conception of, and directed 
towards a shared achievement of, the ultimate human good .... [Second], [p]recisely 
because those engaged in making and sustaining [the community] will be able to act 
effectively only if guided by highly determinate conceptions of the institutions and way 
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reduced.181 Rather than focusing exclusively on claims of right as 
excluding communal concerns, both communal concerns and claims of 
property rights must be considered together in an effort to achieve 
mutual understanding. 
This Essay does not claim that a communitarian approach to real 
property will prove a panacea. Indeed, communitarianism has not 
been without its critics. One might ask what of the rights of property 
owners as against the community?l82 First, although the theory out-
lined above suggests justifications for greater communal control, it 
does not purport to dramatically reconstruct rules governing private 
ownership of real property.183 Second, to the extent that discourse and 
of life which they are engaged in creating, they will have to exclude and prohibit a 
variety of types of activity inimical to and destructive of those institutions and 
that way of life. 
[d. at 108 (emphasis added). The latter principle seems similar to my argument that property 
rights ought not undermine the existence of the community itself. The entrenchment of rights 
talk when considering issues of property, tends to undermine the development of such a shared 
understanding of broader questions of justice as well as the ability of the community to delineate 
specific norms governing property. 
181 The strengthening of individual property rights by the judiciary confounds the importance 
of political discourse within a community. Where a functioning regulatory or adjudicatory 
system might evaluate the conflicting claims of communities and individuals, by strengthening 
individual rights and redrawing the threshold line defining what constitutes relevant harms, the 
role of discourse in the community is reduced. The realm of possible political discourse becomes 
subsumed by the law and legal principles. See generally PAUL CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE 
MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW (1998). Th the extent that postmodernism has shaken our concept 
of truth, the failure of the law to make room for discourse as a means of mediating conflicting 
claims of right seems unjustified at best and arrogant at worst. See generally JURGEN HABER-
MAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1992). 
182 For an example of this type of criticism against communitarians, in particular civic repub-
licans, see Steven G. Gey, The Unfartunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
801, 803 (1993), in which the author suggests that the "left's traditional support for civil liberties 
is incompatible in certain respects with civic republican theory." Gey may be correct that civic 
republicans overstate their case and rely on "faith" that discourse alone will further the public 
good, but he fails to take seriously the need to increase and institutionalize discourse in the 
administration, if not the allocation of rights. [d. at 841. Moreover, as Drucilla Cornell, among 
others, has noted, rights are, in some sense, the sine qua non of the community itself: 
[D]ialogic communitarians argue that: 1) even if the liberal principle of neutrality 
towards competing visions of the good must be rejected, there are still certain basic 
participatory conditions of citizenship that we can call rights, which must be bracketed 
from the day-to-day political struggles. Rights, in other words, must be a part of a 
vision of the collective good in modernity. 
Cornell, supra note 110, at 696. Gey's observations regarding the slippery slope which compro-
mises on civil liberties may entail is not without merit. Nonetheless, as argued in this Essay, 
our conceptions of rights are open to change. Such conceptions can entail a communitarian 
element, without compromising the protection rights afford. 
183 It is not even clear that the Just Compensation Clause was intended to function as the 
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possible compromises regarding the proper weight to afford property 
ownership are undermined by recent Supreme Court rulings, en-
hancement of such mechanisms can promote communitarianism with-
out destroying individual rights. In addition, by reconceiving prop-
erty rights as entailing communal responsibilities, the community also 
incurs certain obligations to the landowner. To this end, regulatory 
flexibility and proper public proceedings in determining dispositions 
of property can safeguard the rights of the landowner while taking 
account of communal concerns. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Many times the debate surrounding property rights involves per-
sons arguing at cross purposes. The environmental movement has 
dramatically reshaped our understanding of property and its role in 
the wider society. As a descriptive matter, we no longer accept the 
notion of property as providing unfettered ownership rights. As Frey-
fogle shows, environmental concerns have reshaped our under-
standing of real property. It is from this vantage point that the cur-
rent Supreme Court's attempt to turn back the clock seems atavistic 
and anti-democratic. While it is clear that our law will always recog-
nize individual property rights, how we define such rights certainly 
has normative implications. With a reevaluation of the effect of real 
property on the development of community, perhaps over time our 
notion of property rights can be expanded to satisfy the countervail-
ing demands of communities. 
current Supreme Court has construed it. Allowing for evolution of our conceptions of the 
Constitution need not allow changes which subvert the very principles of community the 
Constitution was designed to support. Traditional rationales for property ownership are not 
even applicable today, exemplified by the original limitation of voting rights to property owners. 
See generally William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985). Moreover, the notion 
of property rights to which the Takings Clause refers has not been frozen in time. Surely, the 
rise of the regulatory state has affected the law's treatment of property rights. 
